Abstract: This working paper examines social security increases in Ireland as a case study of the existence of political budget cycles in European countries. Ireland is an appropriate country to examine, first because it has a system of proportional representation and some studies suggest that proportional electoral systems are associated with expansions of welfare spending both before and after elections. Second, it is generally recognised that Irish political parties occupy the middle ground in terms of political ideology. Again studies would suggest that an absence of a strong ideological commitment to particular policies may make political budget cycles more likely.
There has been considerable academic debate and research about the existence of political budget cycles. A political budget cycle can be defined as 'a periodic fluctuation in the government's fiscal policies, which is induced by the cyclicality of elections' (Shi and Svensson, 2003) . Much of the research has focused on quantitative studies of a relatively large number of countries. While there have been a number of more specific studies particularly in Latin America, there are relatively few studies in an European context and, in particular, few national studies. This paper takes the case of social security spending in the Republic of Ireland (hereafter Ireland) as a case study in relation to the existence of political budget cycles in developed countries. Ireland is an appropriate country to examine, first because it has a system of proportional representation and some studies suggest that proportional electoral systems are associated with expansions of welfare spending both before and after elections (Persson and Tabellini, 2002) . Second, it is generally recognised that Irish political parties occupy the middle ground in terms of political ideology. Again studies would suggest that an absence of a strong ideological commitment to particular policies may make political budget cycles more likely (Persson and Tabellini, 1990) . This paper examines the issue of whether or not a political budget cycle can be seen in Ireland in relation to social security budget increases.
The first section of this paper reviews the extensive literature in this area. The second section outlines the methodology and approach to this study of the social security (or social welfare as it is known) budget increases in Ireland. The subsequent section presents and analyses the evidence while the final section 4 concludes and summarises the findings.
Literature review
The literature on political budget cycles is an offshoot of the broader debate about the existence of a political business cycle. This studies the effect of politics and in particular elections, on the economy looking, for example, at their impact on GDP growth and unemployment (Shi and Svensson, 2003) . In general, the notion that a country's economic performance could be influenced by political cycles received little academic support not least because of the limited ability of politicians to manipulate the economy (Remmer, 1993; Drazen, 2001; Shi and Svensson, 2003) . Accordingly, research has tended to focus more narrowly on political budget cycles looking at those policy instruments directly within the control of government (such as fiscal policy and government spending). The basic rationale behind the political budget cycle literature is that governments will manipulate fiscal and expenditure policy, in part, in order to obtain electoral success.
There are a number of competing theories as to why such manipulation might be acceptable to voters-some of them relying on the assumption that voters are non-rational.
One of the more credible rationales has been put forward by a Persson and Tabellini (1990) . They argue that governments are primarily interested in securing re-election rather than in implementing ideological policies. They also assume that voters are rational but are unaware of the 'competence' of the political contenders (where competence is defined as efficiency in the provision of public services). Given that voters prefer competent governments, rational voters will interpret a pre-electoral spending boom as a device signalling competence. However, as Kraemer (1997) points out, while this model can serve as a useful starting point, the distinction between competent and incompetent governments is much more blurred in the real world. Voters will find it difficult to distinguish between competent and incompetent governments and an incompetent government will, of course, tend to mimic the behaviour of a competent one and expand spending where elections are expected. This highlights the point that it is not simply the policy measures adopted by a government which are important. Rather voters will also take into account the 'political capital' of the government, the manner in which its proposals are presented and the credibility of the criticisms and alternative proposals advanced by the opposition.
1 As will be discussed in more detail below, social security spending is particularly relevant in this context as it is arguably a clear manner in which a governing party can show its 'competence'.
A number of studies have indeed found evidence of political budget cycles. Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1991) , looking at a sample of 18 OECD countries, found evidence of expansionary monetary policy in election years and also indications of loose fiscal policy prior to elections. In a study of 60 democratic countries in the period from 1960-1998, Persson and Tabellini (2002) found that taxes were cut before elections and painful fiscal adjustments were postponed until after elections (although they found no evidence of a welfare state spending cycle). 2 Of particular interest in an Irish context, Persson and Tabellini (2002) found that majoritarian electoral rules were associated with pre-electoral spending cuts while proportional electoral systems were associated with expansions of welfare spending both before and after elections. However, Brender and Drazen (2004) found both that political budget cycles generally and the relationship with proportional representation was confined to newly established democracies.
A number of recent econometric studies have examined whether political budget cycles can be seen in EU countries but have come to conflicting conclusions. Focusing on taxes and expenditure, Andrikopoulos et al (2004) found no evidence that national governments of the member states of the EU manipulated the fiscal policy instruments at their disposal for electoral purposes. In contrast, focusing on the general government balance, Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) an appropriate country for study.
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Methodology of the study 3 Medina and Lema (2003) . For a review of Latin America generally see Kraemer (1997) . 4 Bittencourt and Hilbrecht (2002) . 5 Eslava (2005) . 6 Bruhn (1996); Dion (2000) ; Gonzalez (2002); Yarahuan (2003) ; Magaloni et al.(2003) . 7 Schady (2000) . 8 Puente (2004) . 9 Kwon (2001) . It is interesting to note that this study of a developmental state found strong evidence that the timing and distribution of public expenditure could be explained by the logic of electoral politics. 10 Tutar and Tansel (2000); Asutay (2004) . 11 See also Akmedov and Zhuravskaya's (2004) study of political cycles in Russia and Galli and Rossi's (2002) study of cycles in German lander. 12 The study also examined the effect of party politics but this aspect is flawed by the fact that it looks only at the impact of left (PvDA) and right wing (VVD) parties and effectively assumes that the Christian Democratic party (CDA) had no influence: a strange assumption when the CDA has been the largest party of government throughout the 20th century and one of the main founders of the Dutch welfare state. 13 Amongst the numerous such references see Carty (1984) , Komito (1984) (Shalev, 2002 , Hall, 2003 Ebbinghaus, 2003) . In addition, as we have seen in the case of recent European studies, where research projects come to different conclusions as to the existence or otherwise of political budget cycles, it is difficult to penetrate the 'black box' of the methodology to discover which finding is 'correct'.
Hall (2003, argues that a substantial gap has opened up between ontology (in the sense of 'the fundamental assumptions that scholars make about the nature of the social and political world and especially about the nature of the causal relationships within that world) and methodology ('the means scholars use for ensuring that their inferences about the social political world are valid'). Most ontologies now assume that policy outcomes are the result of complex interaction effects and various forms of multiple causality whereas many statistical methods are based on much more restrictive assumptions about causal relationships (e.g. independence of variables, steady impact over time and space, absence of multiple causality). This is not to deny the value of statistical methods.
However, it is to insist on the importance of inspecting not only the correspondence between the data representing 'causes' and those representing 'outcomes' but also the process whereby those causal factors operate so as to lead to those outcomes (Hall, 2003) .
As Hall (2003) argues the essence of explanation does not simply lie in specifying a set of 'explanatory variables', particular levels of which can be said to correlate with an outcome, but in explaining the mechanisms whereby one factor leads to another. This study adopts an alternative, more qualitative, approach looking in detail at one particular country.
Many studies use total government expenditure as the dependent variable when examining the existence of a political budget cycle. This approach suffers from the disadvantage that many aspects of government spending may not be particularly effective (or may even be counter effective) in terms of the supposed aims of the political budget cycle. One might expect, therefore, that a political budget cycle would lead to changes in the composition of rather than (or as well as) the size of the budget (see, for example, Eslava, 2005) . Perhaps for these reasons, other studies confine themselves to an examination of welfare state spending. This still suffers from the disadvantage, which also applies to the study of overall government expenditure, that changes in spending are affected by a wide range of factors other than government policy. The ageing of the population, for example, in the absence of any change in public policy, will lead to increased spending on the old-age pensions. Similarly, a rise in unemployment will, absent policy change, lead to an increase in spending on unemployment. Thus, in using total expenditure (either overall government expenditure or total welfare state expenditure) it is necessary to control for such factors. This is not unproblematic and gives rise to questions as to whether the ultimate findings of such studies are correct or simply the result of inadequately controlling for other factors.
In this study we will look at increases in social welfare expenditure. 14 A focus on social security expenditure appears particularly appropriate in examining whether or not political budget cycles exist. Social security expenditure constitutes a significant proportion of total government expenditure in Ireland (over 25 per cent. of current expenditure). In addition, the vast bulk of the expenditure goes directly to a large number of voters rather than being absorbed in administration costs. Thirdly, improvements in the social security area are quickly apparent without the lead time often necessary in other policy areas such as health or education.
In the Irish context, the particular structure of the Irish budgetary process provides an alternative source of data which helps to avoid issues of controlling for non-policy related changes in government spending. For largely historical reasons, increases in social security spending in Ireland normally involve a two-stage process. First, some weeks before the budget, increases due to demographic and labour market changes are announced in the Estimates. These aim to provide the necessary resources to fund the existing level of benefits in the following financial year on what has become known as a 'no policy change' basis, i.e. having regard to likely changes in the number of claimants but making no allowance for increases in benefit rates, improvements in schemes nor the introduction of new benefits. In contrast, in the area of other social services such as health and education, the Estimates normally make provision for improvement in services in the coming year. 15 Second, on Budget day, the Minister for Finance announces what has become known as the 'social welfare budget package', i.e. a specific amount of money provided for increases in rates, improvements in existing schemes, or the introduction of new schemes. This is now a longstanding practice. It first appears -in an
Irish context-in the first Fianna Fáil budget of 1932 albeit that there is an element of inconsistency in following decades as to whether funding will appear in the Estimates or in the Budget. 16 However, since 1960 there has been a consistent pattern of announcing a sum in the budget for social security improvements (known hereafter as the social welfare budget package although the term itself appears to be of more recent origin).
Given the basic objective underlined the political budget cycle approach, i.e. to encourage voters to vote for the relevant political party, the social welfare budget package appears a very useful indicator of whether or not a political budget cycle exists.
The general assumption is that-in most political contexts-governments will receive little credit for simply ensuring that existing (or future) claimants receive the benefits already provided for them. Rather-at least in an Irish context-there is a longstanding expectation 15 Of course, in some cases, the Estimates may also provide for reductions (cutbacks) in certain services as in the 2004 social welfare estimates. This, however, is the exception rather than the rule and such reductions tend to be of a relatively minor nature in the context of the overall estimates. There are a number of exceptions to this when cutbacks were quite significant such as in 1987. 16 For example, funding for the introduction of unemployment assistance in 1934 was provided in the Estimates rather than in the Budget. amongst voters that governments will attempt to ensure that benefits are 'improved' or at the very least that they do not disimprove in real terms. A focus on the social welfare budget package allows this aspect of government policy to be analysed disregarding 'existing commitments' without having to introduce complex methods of statistical control.
The social welfare budget package is, of course, not a perfect measure. First, the social welfare budget package only relates to the cost of improvements in the current financial year and in the following full financial year. 17 The longer-term impact of significant increases is subsumed into the Estimates after the first year. In addition, there are issues of the data comparability over the long-term examined in this study. While, in recent years, data are available for both the current and full year costs, in many cases only the current year cost is given in earlier budgets. 18 For this reason the analysis in the following section focuses primarily on periods for which comparable data are available rather than trying to make a comparison over the entire period. Third, one cannot simply compare the size of the social welfare budget package for example 1933 with that in say 2003. 17 The "current year" cost relates to the cost of the measure in the current financial year. The "full-year" cost relates to the cost in a full financial year. Insofar as a budget measure is implemented from the start of the financial year, the two costs would be the same. However, it is often the case for financial or administrative reasons that a new policy measure is implemented during the financial year and the cost in the current year is therefore less than it would be in a full financial year. The full year cost is obviously the more reliable measure and is used wherever possible in this study. However, it is unfortunately the case that, particularly in the earlier period, the cost is often only provided on the current year basis. There is, however, a high degree of correlation be two series which indicates that, overall, the current year data does provide a reliable indicator of budgetary trends. 18 There are almost certainly other definitional changes in how the social welfare budget package is costed over time. Unfortunately the detailed method of calculation is rarely available for earlier years.
While there are a variety of ways of controlling for the fact that the value of money changes over time, in this analysis we present data in relation to the budget package as a percentage of national income, where this is available (see appendix 1).
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Identifying a political budget cycle
How might we identify a political budget cycle? Firstly, over the period for which consistent budgetary increases have been provided and for which comparable data are available we look at the size of the social welfare budget package as a percentage of gross national/domestic product in pre-election budgets (i.e. the one or two budgets before an election), post-election budgets (the budget after an election) and nonelection budgets. Secondly, given that we might expect that the existence of political budget cycles will vary over time and because some data are only comparable within specific time periods, we analyse in a more qualitative manner social welfare budget packages over specific periods. Intuitively we might expect that the ruling party would provide increased social welfare budget packages in the one or two budgets before an election, while an opposition party (which obviously can't do this) would promise increased benefits in the election campaign and deliver these in the one or two budgets after the election (thereafter itself following the pattern of a ruling party). In this study we look at whether pre-or post budgets (shown as a percentage of national) are significantly higher than the preceding or following budgets. 20 The findings are discussed in more detail in the following section.
21 19 Although not included in appendix 1, the analysis also looked at increases in the cost of living in the relevant periods. 20 For the purposes of this analysis, we define the pre-election budget normally as the budget immediately before the election. Post-election budgets are taken to be the budget immediately after an election. While a But can evidence of any political budget cycle be seen in relation to social security expenditure increases? We look firstly at the overall position in the period from 1960 when consistent and comparable data are available.
case could be made for examining the two budgets before and after an election, in the Irish case this would result in almost no nonelection budgets. In a small number of cases where the parliamentary term ran for five years, we include two pre-election projects. 21 A more detailed discussion of the methodology is found in appendix 1. 22 The data (outlined in Appendix 1) is taken from the budget speeches of successive Ministers for Finance which are published in the Dáil debates and as separate booklets from 1958. Data for the period 1991-2007 was kindly provided by the Department of Social and Family Affairs.
Insert table 1
As can be seen, overall pre -election budgets do tend to be considerably larger and postelections budgets somewhat larger than in non-election years. However, there is very substantial year-on-year variation in budget sizes and the removal of the pre-election budgets in 1980 and 1981 would entirely remove the pre-election year advantage (as would the removal of the record 1973 budget affect the post-election advantage).
Accordingly, it is necessary to look in more detail at the individual time periods.
1922-57
Following a period of rebellion, Ireland became independent of the United Kingdom in
1922. This was immediately followed by a split in the Sinn Féin party which led to the establishment of two main parties: Cumann na nGaedheal (later Fine Gael) and Fianna
Fáil. In the initial period from 1923 to 1932, with the fiscally conservative Cumann na nGaedheal in power, there is no evidence of any political budget cycle. This is unsurprising given that the government of the period did not generally seek support through social policy expenditure and, in fact, became infamous for its reduction in old age pension rates. However, while party political factors clearly played a role in the introduction of this scheme, the specific timing of its introduction does not appear to be related to a political budget cycle. Indeed, although it marked a significant increase in welfare spending, the 1952 budget was widely seen as extremely harsh and included the scrapping of food subsidies (albeit with the provision of some additional compensation through the social security system) (see Bew and Patterson,1982, 65) .
1957-72
This period covers the second era of Fianna Fáil hegemony. This is the first period for which increases are a consistently provided on an annual basis (from 1960). As set out in table 1, expenditure increases provided, while quite modest compared to the 1930s or later periods, were significantly higher in the pre and post-election budgets than in nonelection years. However, any significant political budget cycle effect in this period appears to be confined to the 1969 and 1973 elections. 24 And even here the very modest nature of the effect -compared to the post-1973 increases -must be emphasised.
Insert figure 1 
1973-86
This was a second period of political instability. Insert figure 2 25 The analysis here is based on current year data. However, full year data are available for about half the budgets and are very strongly correlated with the current year data (0.89). 26 I have categorised this as a pre-election budget. Obviously an election was not intended at this time. However, given that the Fine Gael led government was in a minority position, an election must have been in the minds of those framing the budget. This budget, insofar as these social security aspects went, was substantially enacted by the Fianna Fáil government which took office later that year.
There is no indication of a political budget cycle in the rest of this period. The Fine GaelLabour coalition did provide very significant increases in social security expenditure in mid-1970s dwarfing the sort of increases which had been provided by Fianna Fáil in the previous decade. 27 However, these increases are almost countercyclical from a political point of view. The largest increases were provided in the years following the 1973 election and increases had reduced significantly by the time of the 1977 election.
Subsequently the 1982-86 coalition also provided moderate increases which were again almost counter-cyclical falling in size as the election approached. figure 3 and 4) . 29 The Fianna Fáil-Labour coalition, elected in 1992, fell in late 1994 and, for the only time to date, a new 'Rainbow' government-27 While inflation was very high in the period, reaching 20.9 per cent. in 1975, this does not account for the significant increase. For example, the nominal size of the budget package increased by almost 500 per cent. from 1972 to 1973 at a time when inflation was 11.4 per cent. 28 There was, in effect, no pre-election budget on this occasion as the two parties failed to agree a budget and elections were called: (Laver et al., 1987) . 29 The 1992 election, in particular, was unintended resulting from the withdrawal of support by the Progressive Democrat party for the Fianna Fail led government: Gallagher and Laver (1993) . 
Conclusion
In total we find that elections were the occasion for a significant pre-or post increase in the size of the social welfare budget package at 12 elections 32 out of the 26 elections included in this study. 33 However, of these, four related to a change in the party in power which was not subsequently followed by the evidence of a political budget cycle. 34 It seems inappropriate to describe the implementation of different policies as evidence of a 31 Although Mink and de Haan (2005) come to the opposite conclusion. 32 These were 1932 These were , 1944 These were , 1948 These were , 1951 These were , 1965 These were , 1969 These were , 1973 These were (both pre-and post-), 1981 These were (twice), 1982 These were , 2002 These were and 2007 The elections of the first four Dails are excluded. The first three elections did not take place under normal circumstances. While a more or less normal politics may have resumed by the 1923 election, there was little opportunity in this election for the development of a political budget cycle. 34 In 1932 34 In , 1948 34 In , 1951 34 In and 1973 political budget cycle. In addition, it is difficult to categorise the 1965 election pattern as a political budget cycle.
Our study does indicate that political budget cycles existed in relation to the Irish social security budget process in relation to eight of the elections studied (about one-third).
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The first such occurrence is in 1944 when Fianna Fáil altered its previous approach and put much more emphasis on social policy expenditure (Cousins, 2003, 118-20) . Recall that an increase in the social security expenditure is apparent twice in the 1973 election: firstly a very modest political budget cycle effect before the election and, subsequently, a much more of a significant but noncyclical increase after the change of government in that election.
2) Political budget cycles appear to be more likely where there is a relatively little policy difference between the parties contesting for election for example in 1944 (Lee, 1989 ), 2002 (Benoit and Laver, 2006 and 2007, and where the ruling party remains in office in the long-term (for example in 1944, 1969 and 1973, 2002 and 2007) . We might suggest that the reason for these patterns is related to the difficulty which a party, which has been in power for a long period and which has relatively little 36 Benoit and Laver's (2006) study of party positions in 2002 reports less difference between the two main Irish parties than is to be found in most other countries studied -a view confirmed by a national study of voter estimates (Benoit and Laver, 2005) and by Benoit and Laver's (2003) finding of 'little significant difference' between the 'economic' policy positions of the election manifestos of the three main parties. Unfortunately, however, there is no quantitative measure of party policy differences over time. 37 Whether or not such governments might take this as an indicator that they should adopt a political budget cycle approach to enhance their prospects of re-election and/or speculation as to why they have not done so to date falls outside the scope of this paper.
substantive policy difference from its main rival (and, in recent years, is affected by falling party identification (Marsh, 2006) The table above sets out the principal data relied on in this analysis. Column 1 sets out the date of each Budget while column 2 provides the reference to the parliamentary debates setting out the details of the Budget. Since 1959 full details of the Budget are published in an annual Budget booklet. Columns 3 and 4set out the current and full year amounts of the social welfare budget packages in current values (£ to 18992 and E thereafter). As will be seen, only the current year amount is given in many of the earlier years although now -as the Budget year and calendar year are aligned -the full year
